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Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran: the role of identity processes 
 
Rusi Jaspal 
De Montfort University, Leicester, UK 
 
Anti-Semitism is a peculiar socio-psychological phenomenon. It is often subsumed under general 
psychosocial phenomena such as ‘prejudice’, ‘discrimination’ or ‘racism’ and there is little 
agreement in the literature regarding the most accurate way of defining it.1 Although there is 
some overlap between these constructs, anti-Semitism is a unique and highly complex 
phenomenon in its own right. Anti-Zionism is a similarly broad construct. It can refer to 
opposition to Jewish nationhood and/ or the rejection of ideologies underlying the State of 
Israel.2 Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism constitute two important ideological building blocks of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, with important real-world consequences for its citizens and the 
broader Middle East region. While these constructs are conceptually delineable, there is evidence 
to suggest that they are inextricably entwined in social representations encouraged and 
disseminated by the Islamic regime in Iran. This highlights the possibility that anti-Semitism is 
increasingly manifested through the more ‘socially acceptable’ anti-Zionist route.3 Through the 
interpretive lens of socio-psychological theorising on identity processes, the present paper 
explores the motivational principles of identity underlying anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the 
specific national context of Iran. 
 
Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism 
In its broadest sense, anti-Semitism refers to prejudice and hostility towards Jews on the basis of 
their ethno-cultural and/ or religious group membership. More specifically, anti-Semitic doctrine 
attributes to the Jews an exceptional position in the broader social matrix, dehumanises them as 
an inferior group and generally excludes them from dominant society.4 There has been little 
temporal or cross-cultural consistency in anti-Semitism; negative stereotypes of Jews have 
mutated radically in accordance with temporal and socio-cultural context. For instance, while 
Nazi Germany and the Argentinean dictatorship accused the Jews of siding with socialists and 
communists, the Soviet Union persecuted the Jews for their alleged sympathies with the 
capitalist West.5 Anti-Semitism has a history of several millennia and can plausibly be thought of 
as one of the most enduring forms of prejudice against any single group. Indeed, Jewish history 
is fraught with acts of persecution. The Jewish people were exiled from their homeland of Judah 
during the rule of the Babylonian Empire. Moreover, the Jewish exile that followed the Roman 
Occupation in the 1st Century AD gave rise to a Jewish Diaspora all over the world.6 In their new 
host countries in the Christian world, Jews were accused of deicide (the killing of Christ) and the 
ritualistic murders of Gentiles. These charges were frequently invoked as a justification for the 
exclusion and persecution of the Jews.7 The historical charge of deicide, coupled with the 
attribution of localised social ills to the Jews, culminated in their eventual expulsion from several 
European countries: England in 1290; from Spain in 1492; and from Portugal in 1497. Since 
then, Anti-Semitism was consistently manifested in a variety of media. For centuries, Jews have 
been demonised in the visual arts, in Modern European thought, in Muslim thought, and in 
contemporary European culture.8  
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 Undoubtedly, the most devastating and historically salient act of anti-Semitism by any 
single group was the Holocaust, which was perpetrated by the Nazis and their collaborators from 
the early 1940s until 1945.9 During this time, at least six million Jews were murdered, which 
devastated the European Ashkenazi Jewish community. In many cases, the Holocaust has 
become a metaphor for Jewish history.10 Paradoxically, the most destructive act of persecution 
against the Jews is often employed by anti-Semites in order to further demonise the Jews. 
Holocaust denial may legitimately be regarded as a form of anti-Semitism, since this ‘distorts 
and denies Jewish history and deprives the Jews of their human dignity by presenting their worst 
tragedy as a scam’, while charging ‘the Jews with unscrupulous machinations in order to achieve 
illegitimate and immoral goals, mainly financial extortion’.11  
‘New anti-Semitism’ constitutes a newer version of Jew-hatred, which is habitually 
manifested in the guise of anti-Zionism. In Europe this is associated largely with ‘leftists, 
vociferously opposed to the policies of Israel, and right-wing antisemites, committed to the 
destruction of Israel, [who] were joined by millions of Muslims, including Arabs, who 
immigrated to Europe […] and who brought with them their hatred of Israel in particular and of 
Jews in general.’12 However, this amalgamation of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is most 
conspicuous in the Middle East, given the recent history of intergroup relations between Jews 
and Muslims. In the early days of Jewish settlement in Palestine, violent confrontations broke out 
between Zionist Jews and Arabs regarding Jewish rights to settle in the land.13 Moreover, 
multiple recurring conflicts have arisen between Israel and the neighbouring Arab nations 
regarding the legitimacy of the State of Israel. This has given rise to an antagonistic 
psychological intergroup repertoire between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East.14 Accordingly, 
anti-Semitic diatribes in the form of theological allusions to Jews as ‘pigs’ and ‘apes’ are 
frequent in the mass media in the Arab and Muslim world. These negative comments tend to be 
grounded in several, arguably misunderstood, Koranic verses and other Islamic theological 
sources such as ‘Ahadith’.15  
Many Arab and Muslim politicians attempt to highlight their opposition to the state of 
Israel rather than to Jews as a religious group, which is supported to evidence their 
‘differentiation’ between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. However, scholars have argued that 
the two social phenomena may in fact be highly inter-related in the political rhetoric of Arab and 
Muslim leaders.16 Speakers frequently employ the categories ‘Jew’ and ‘Zionist’ more or less 
interchangeably, suggesting an underlying prejudice towards Jews.17 The effects of both anti-
Semitic and anti-Zionist social representations, at the institutional level, for meaning-making in 
the general population in Arab and Muslim societies are difficult to ascertain, particularly in the 
absence of any conclusive quantitative data regarding the extent and acceptance of anti-Jewish 
representations. However, an opinion poll in Jordan, which incidentally maintains diplomatic ties 
with the Jewish state, reveals that 99 per cent of respondents hold unfavourable opinions about 
Jews.18 Thus, it is reasonable to predict that in those nations, in which anti-Semitic imagery is 
commonplace and encouraged by the national institutions, endorsement of anti-Semitic prejudice 
will be high. 
 
New anti-Semitism in Iran 
Unlike most other countries in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran openly endorses 
anti-Semitism, which it incorporates within its anti-Zionist program. In fact it has been argued 
that ‘no other regime in the world is as anti-Semitic as that of the Mullahs in Tehran’.19 The 
origins of Iranian anti-Semitism lie in the installation of Islam as the state religion in Iran in the 
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7th Century AD, which resulted in the ‘inferiorisation’ of the socio-political status of Jews in 
Iran.20 Jews were segregated, forced to pay poll tax and pervasively regarded as inferior to the 
Muslim majority, as exemplified by their ‘Dhimmi’ status. The arrival of the Safavid dynasty in 
Iran in the 16th century AD further aggravated Muslim-Jewish relations. Modern anti-Semitism 
in Iran can be linked to Shiite ideology, which reflects institutionalised processes of social 
influence and the collective attempt to achieve and maintain a ‘shared reality’ and world-view.21 
Indeed, Shiite Islam has a long history of radical anti-Semitism. Even until the nineteenth 
century, there were harsh social restrictions on Iranian Jews, who were, at best, regarded as 
second class citizens. Moreover, they were subjected to pogroms and forced conversions to 
Shiite Islam. During the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), Iranian Jews enjoyed a short 
interval of social prosperity, and there were warm relations between the Imperial State of Iran 
and Israel.22 However, from the 1960s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the future Supreme Leader 
of the Islamic Republic, publicly denounced and demonised the Jews, referring to them as inter 
alia ‘infidels’ and ‘impure creatures’.23 Moreover, since the overthrow of the monarchy and 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran’s clerics and politicians have 
consistently denounced Israel, questioning its legitimacy as an independent state and, repeated, 
called for its destruction.24 Even during the paradoxical Iran-Contra Affair (1985-1987), in which 
Iran allegedly purchased arms from the State of Israel with US authorisation, despite Iran’s 
official opposition to the USA and its refusal to recognise Israel, there was no cessation of anti-
Zionism at the level of the Iranian regime. This demonstrates that, despite any potential 
economic and military benefits of Iranian relations with the State of Israel, the regime’s anti-
Zionist stance does seem to perform some important socio-psychological functions. These 
functions are explored in the present paper.  
There are various important reasons for focusing upon the Iranian national context. 
Firstly, the regime is unique in overtly subscribing to a hybrid anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic 
political agenda. Although the Islamic regime attempts to differentiate between anti-Zionism and 
anti-Semitism, the underlying anti-Semitic agenda frequently surfaces. This is manifested subtly 
through the interchangeable use of the categories ‘Jew’ and ‘Zionist’ in political discourse and, 
more overtly, through the Iranian regime’s blatant denial of the Holocaust.25 Secondly, Iran 
presents a unique demographic situation, since it constitutes the Muslim country with the highest 
Jewish population (approx. 25,000).26 Thus, while Iran’s overt anti-Zionism impinges upon 
international relations, its more covert anti-Semitism has implications for the Jewish community 
within its borders.27 Thirdly, the Islamic regime is the most vociferous critic of Israel, repeatedly 
calling for its destruction and for the displacement of its people. It is important to investigate the 
socio-psychological motives potentially underlying anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. This may 
provide a more accurate account of why the Islamic Republic, despite never having engaged in 
military conflict or border or economic disputes with Israel, adamantly maintains its anti-Zionist 
agenda. 
 
Aims 
There have been a number of important writings examining anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in 
Iran, primarily from a socio-historical perspective.28 Here it is argued that this detailed and 
insightful work may be complemented by theorising from social psychology. Few studies have 
considered the socio-psychological motives for anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, instead 
outlining the strategic benefits of this discrimination in localised contexts (e.g. Iran’s ambitions 
regarding influence in the region). The present paper addresses this lacuna through a review of 
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this existing literature on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran through the lens of socio-
psychological theorising on identity processes. It theorises anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism as 
socio-psychological phenomena and proposes predictions regarding the manifestation and 
acceptance (at the social level) of these forms of prejudice. More specifically, the aim of the 
paper is to highlight those motivational principles of identity likely to be associated with, or 
served by, the construction and manifestation of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism at the 
institutional level of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, it outlines how the principles of identity 
may be affected by social representations of Jews, which are prevalent in Iran. The theoretical 
framework consists of identity process theory and social representations theory. 
 
Identity processes and social representations: threat and coping 
The primary focus of this paper lies in the identification of those identity principles potentially 
underlying anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism within the Iranian regime, since they motivate social 
behaviour.29 The Islamic regime constitutes the focus since it is a major source of societal 
information in Iran and is, thus, in a position to shape social representations concerning Jews and 
Israel in the general population. It has been argued that identity processes can best be understood 
through the exploration of how individuals and groups respond to threatened identity. Identity 
process theory (IPT) provides an integrative theory of identity threat and coping.30 It outlines (i) 
the necessary components of a positive identity; (ii) the psychosocial contexts, in which identity 
may be susceptible to threat; and (iii) the strategies, which will likely be implemented by the 
individual or group in attempting to cope with threat. The individual or group needs to perceive 
appropriate levels of self-continuity across time (continuity); uniqueness and differentiation from 
relevant others (distinctiveness); competence and control over their lives and future (self-
efficacy); feelings of worth and value (self-esteem); significance and purpose within their lives 
(meaning); belonging within social groups (belonging); and compatibility and coherence 
between elements of their identities (psychological coherence). It is noteworthy that these 
principles may be construed at both individual and collective levels, so it is possible to talk of 
individual distinctiveness and intergroup distinctiveness, for instance.31 Indeed, the present paper 
is concerned primarily with how identity principles function at the institutional level of the 
Iranian regime.  
IPT holds that if the individual or social group cannot perceive appropriate levels of these 
principles, identity is threatened, which is aversive for psychological well-being. Previous 
research into the relations between group-level identity threat and coping suggests that, in the 
presence of perceived realistic and symbolic threats from outgroups, some identity principles 
may be more susceptible to threat than others.32 In previous work, IPT researchers have 
presented a ‘typology’ of group-level threat and the likely consequences for the self-concept by 
drawing upon relevant concepts from IPT and intergroup threat theory.33 They argue that (i) 
realistic threats, which are posed by factors which cause the ingroup physical harm or loss of 
resources, and (ii) symbolic threats, which contradict the meaning system(s) or worldview of the 
ingroup, will likely affect the self-concept in different ways. Here, it is suggested that the 
belonging, self-efficacy and continuity principles of identity are most susceptible to influence in 
thinking about Jews and Israel. 
Although all of the principles may be construed at the individual or group levels, the 
continuity principle functions differently in accordance with the level of human interdependence. 
Perceived changes in the surrounding social environment (symbolic threats) may disrupt the 
unifying psychological thread between past, present and future, threatening intrapsychic 
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continuity. Conversely, the perception of an outgroup as a realistic threat to the ingroup may be 
seen as a threat to the survival of the ingroup as a ‘potent distinctive and collective social entity 
within intergroup contexts’.34 This threatens group continuity. Here it is argued that Jews may be 
positioned and perceived as posing both symbolic and realistic threats to Muslims, engendering 
the perception of a ‘hybridised threat’.35 
A key tenet of the theory is that the individual or social group will attempt to alleviate 
identity threat by engaging in various coping strategies, such as denial, re-conceptualisation of 
the threatening situation or group mobilisation against the threatening stimulus.36 In addition to 
outlining the possible motives underlying anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, the present paper 
highlights the possibility that the institutionalisation of social representations which discriminate 
against Jews and Israel may in fact constitute a strategy for coping with identity threat. Identity 
threat and the strategies for coping are partly determined by social representations functioning in 
a given social context. IPT acknowledges the importance of social representations in shaping 
how social phenomena will impact the identity principles.37 According to the theory, a ‘social 
representation is essentially a construction of reality’, which enables individuals to interpret the 
social world and to render it meaningful.38 Two key processes of social representation include (i) 
‘objectification’, whereby abstract phenomena (e.g. Jewish efficacy, competence and control) are 
rendered concrete (e.g. Israel); and (ii) ‘anchoring’ which is the means by which unfamiliar 
phenomena (e.g. anti-Zionism) are integrated into existing ways of thinking (e.g. anti-
Semitism).39 Indeed, the state of Israel may be employed as a means of ‘objectifying’ the social 
ills of the world, providing a tangible, psychologically accessible social entity amid crisis. 
Moreover, it will be demonstrated how the Iranian regime may anchor social representations of 
the ‘Zionist threat’ to historical theological representations of the ‘Jewish threat’. Moving 
beyond social representations, certain ideas regarding Israel and Jews may in fact constitute 
nexuses, which refer to indisputable ideas and symbolic emblems that correspond to ‘prelogical 
affective knots shared by a large number of individuals’.40 Nexuses differ from social 
representations in that they constitute ‘a more narrow, more radical, more collective and more 
mobilising modality’ with important implications for social behaviour.41  
The remainder of the paper applies key tenets of IPT to the existing literature on anti-
Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran. There will be a focus upon: (i) restoring feelings of belonging 
in the Muslim world and beyond; (ii) the inter-relations between ingroup and outgroup self-
efficacy; (iii) the maintenance of Shiite ideology and Khomeini’s legacy; and (iv) the construal 
of Jews and Israel as threats to ingroup continuity, and the use of Holocaust denial as a coping 
strategy. 
 
Restoring belonging in the Muslim world and beyond 
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the regime in Iran has been subject to 
isolation from neighbouring countries in the predominantly Sunni Arab world and from the 
international community, more generally. Iran’s isolation from the international community 
stems largely from its antagonism towards the United States, Israel and the West in general.42 
Indeed, the key tenets of Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology were based around the rejection of 
Western ‘immorality’, which was regarded as infiltrating and polluting Shiite Muslim Iranian 
society. These were attributed by Iran’s revolutionaries to the perceived submission of the Shah 
of Iran to ‘Western hegemony’. On the other hand, Iran’s historical isolation from the rest of the 
Muslim world may be attributed to the sectarian divide between Iran’s leadership and that of all 
of the Arab states. Iran is governed by Shiite clerics, while the vast majority of the Arab world is 
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led by Sunni monarchies and governments. Thus, relations between Iran and neighbouring 
countries in the Middle East have been affected by underlying sectarian conflict.43 This sectarian 
conflict has induced fear among some Sunni leaders that the Islamic Republic is engaged in a 
power struggle, seeking to establish Shiite hegemony over, and to mobilise Shiite minorities in, 
Sunni-ruled countries. Indeed, this was the primary cause for the Iran-Iraq War, which Iraq 
initiated by invading neighbouring Iran.44 Given the importance of perceived closeness, 
acceptance and inclusion from relevant others, even at the intergroup level, it is reasonable to 
assume that the belonging principle may have been chronically threatened since the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic. Iran went from being a nation-state with considerable 
acceptance and inclusion on the international stage to an ostracised, ‘rogue’ nation-state subject 
to political and economic sanctions.45 Members of isolated groups will likely counteract 
perceived opposition from outgroups through the general strengthening of intra-group 
relations.46 In short, the more a social group is threatened from the outside, the more united it 
becomes from within. The very fact that social groups generally seek recognition from and 
reconciliation with even hostile outgroups highlights the psychosocial importance of belonging 
at the intergroup level. While individuals belong in social groups, social groups too must belong 
within a broader social matrix.47  
The belonging principle may be enhanced through the demonisation of the Jews and 
Israel. Anti-Semitic social representations are frequently discernible in Iranian diatribes against 
Israel, which has been attributed to the notion that anti-Semitism is integral to the Shiite religious 
tradition in Iran.48 Khomeini employed and disseminated anti-Semitic social representations in 
order to exploit their ‘mobilising power’ among Iranians, enhancing intra-group unity against the 
constructed aggressor, namely the Shah of Iran. Indeed, it has been observed that the Shah was 
derogated as a ‘Jew in disguise’.49 This constituted an effective means of mobilising Iranian 
society against him, given the pervasiveness of anti-Jewish feeling even during the Pahlavi-ruled 
‘golden age’ of Iranian Jewry. Although the Imperial State of Iran held diplomatic relations with 
the Jewish State and did not actively discriminate against the Jewish minority, dominant social 
representations of Iranians Jews were largely negative among the Shiite Muslim majority.50 This 
further demonstrates the potential clout of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist social representations in 
mobilising and unifying the Iranian public. 
It is argued that the reproduction of anti-Zionist social representations protects the 
regime’s sense of belonging in the Arab Muslim world. After securing power in Iran, Khomeini 
elevated the theological importance of Jerusalem to a much higher position than it had ever 
previously occupied in Shiite thought as a means of appealing to the largely Sunni Arab world. 
Furthermore, the Islamic regime continues to express its solidarity with the Palestinian cause 
through its symbolic designation of the last Friday of the holy Islamic month of Ramadan as Yom 
al-Qods (Jerusalem Day).51 This symbolic act is meant to reflect the extent of Iran’s solidarity 
with the Palestinians and with Muslims, in general, thereby attenuating the Shiite-Sunni divide, 
which has historically been the source of intergroup conflict in the region.52 Ali Akbar 
Rafsanjani, a leading political figure in contemporary Iran, has declared that opposition to the 
Jewish State is the sacred duty of god-fearing Muslims, which echoes the social representation 
encouraged by Khomeini that the Muslims are engaged in a ‘battle’ against Israel.53 The 
anchoring of anti-Zionism to Muslim duty establishes social representational linkage between 
religious and political categories, further obscuring the conceptual distinction between anti-
Semitism and anti-Zionism. Assertions of this kind against a ‘common enemy’ highlight the 
integrity and unity of the ingroup against the designated outgroup. Incidentally, this process has 
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been found to function among sections of Israeli Jewish society when thinking about intergroup 
relations with the Arab Muslim outgroup.54 The central point is that the accentuation of 
intergroup (Muslim-Jewish) distinctiveness is conducive to the accentuation of intra-group 
(Muslim) belonging. Anti-Zionism constitutes a pivotal element of this process of identity 
management. The aforementioned Iran Contra Affair, in which arms were transferred from Israel 
to the Islamic Republic with US authorisation, caused much controversy in the Arab world. In 
fact, the controversy was first reported in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Shiraa, providing the 
potential to ostracise the Islamic regime in the Arab world due to its ‘dealings’ with Israel.55 
In addition to anti-Zionism, it is likely that the dissemination of specific anti-Semitic 
social representations and nexuses (e.g. mythicisation of the Holocaust) perform positive 
functions for ingroup belonging in the Middle East. It is argued that the conflation of Zionism 
and Judaism has the effect of ‘Islamising’ the Arab-Israeli conflict, since the conflict is anchored 
to religious difference.56 Thus, it is constructed in terms of a struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 
Senior clerical figures in contemporary Iran have constructed the key goal of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as the quest to rid Palestine of Jews in their entirety. Since the conflict is constructed as a 
religious one, in which Muslims will be the victors, anti-Zionist social representations alone do 
not suffice. Rather, anti-Semitic representations grounded within Shiite religious thought are 
employed. In political discourse, the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem by Muslim forces is constructed in 
terms of ‘an obligation to be undertaken by the entire Muslim world’, conducive to ‘greater 
Islamic cohesion and solidarity’.57 The emphasis of the collective Muslim struggle serves the 
belonging principle of identity, since it positions Shiite Iranians alongside Sunni Muslims, 
glossing over the sectarian and ethno-national differences. The Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide no 
longer constitutes the source of intergroup distinctiveness. Instead, distinctiveness is derived 
from the Muslim-Jewish religious divide. In short, the employment, dissemination and 
institutionalisation of anti-Semitic nexuses of this kind may be conducive to greater acceptance 
and endorsement of the Islamic Republic in a region, where sectarian differences habitually 
constitute a primary source of distinctiveness and conflict.   
Anti-Zionism constitutes one means of accentuating intergroup commonalities and 
attenuating intergroup differences between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East. For instance, 
Iran has established close links with the secular regime in Syria on the basis of their mutual 
hostility to Israel.58 This indicates that subscription to anti-Zionism can indeed constitute the 
basis for superordinate identification and hence enhanced belonging within the Middle East.59 
Given the negative social representations of the State of Israel in the Middle East, the 
endorsement and dissemination of anti-Zionist nexuses will likely stimulate feelings of a shared 
collective struggle against a common enemy, namely the State of Israel. 
Indeed, the anti-Semitic diatribes of the Iranian president, including his frequent 
problematisation of the reality of the Holocaust, have been warmly welcomed and publicly 
commended by key figures in the Arab world. In many cases, this has attenuated sectarian and 
ideological differences between the Shiite Iranians and the Sunni Arabs. Hamas’ political leader 
Khaled Mashaal described Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Holocaust as 
‘courageous’ while highlighting that ‘Muslim people will defend Iran because it voices what 
they have in their hearts, in particular, the Palestinian people’.60 These comments demonstrate 
admiration for Iran’s ‘courageous’ stance and evidence the superordinate Muslim identity, which 
overrides specific national and sectarian divisions. However, it is noteworthy that some political 
figures in the Islamic Republic, such as the ‘reformist’ presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, 
have condemned the Iranian president’s denial of the Holocaust, highlighting that it ‘only serves 
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to antagonize the West’ and to ‘help the rest of the world to stand by Israel’.61 Karroubi’s 
description of the President’s Holocaust denial as ‘harmful’ to Iran’s interests does not 
necessarily demonstrate his acceptance of the Holocaust as a historical reality. Rather, it exhibits 
a tension between the need for belonging in the Middle East (facilitated by endorsing anti-
Semitism), on the one hand, and the conflicting need for accepance by the broader Western 
world (facilitating by rejecting anti-Semitism), on the other. 
There is little doubt that Holocaust denial, in particular, has been employed by the 
Islamic regime as a means of ‘uniting’ the primarily Muslim Middle East. The ‘Holocaust 
International Cartoon Contest’ was organised by the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri, and 
endorsed by the Islamic regime, in February 2006.62 Most submissions came from Arab 
countries and almost unanimously depicted the Holocaust in terms of a Jewish conspiracy and/ or 
Palestinian suffering. For instance, the winning cartoon (from Morocco) made a comparison 
between Auschwitz concentration camp and the Israeli security barrier, while the runner up (also 
from Morocco) represented the Holocaust in terms of a Jewish fabrication albeit with real 
Palestinian victims.63 Competitions of this kind provide an international platform, though a 
predominantly Arab-Iranian Muslim one, in order to problematise and deny the reality of the 
Holocaust in creative and accessible ways. Crucially, this platform provides Holocaust deniers 
with feelings of acceptance, inclusion and belonging within a like-minded community, in which 
national and sectarian differences cease to be of phenomenological importance vis-à-vis the 
common agenda of demonising Jews and the State of Israel. 
The Islamic regime has attempted to legitimise its controversial position regarding the 
Holocaust, since this constitutes one source of ‘otherisation’ on the international stage, resulting 
in threatened belonging. As IPT indicates, challenging the legitimacy of others’ evaluations of 
one’s actions may constitute a strategy for coping with identity threat.64 Thus, the Iranian media 
have given wide coverage to the social ostracisation of, and, in some cases, legal action against, 
European Holocaust deniers, such as Fredrick Toben and the Roger Garaudy. More specifically, 
the media have strategically constructed the actions of these men as seeking to ‘prove the 
falsehood of this historical allegation [the Holocaust] on the basis of reliable evidence’.65 
Moreover, it is implied, and often explicitly argued, that Western condemnation of those who 
question the reality of the Holocaust demonstrates that the Holocaust must constitute a ‘Jewish-
Western conspiracy’. Thus, while the Western media condemn these men as racist Holocaust 
deniers, the Iranian regime habitually re-construes the legitimacy of Western evaluations, 
implying that the Western media too are at the mercy of the ‘Jewish-Western conspiracy’. 
Conversely, the Holocaust deniers are represented as impartially attempting to forward the field 
of social science by exploring ‘scientifically’ the reality of a historical event. Indeed, the 
Holocaust-denying Islamic regime in Iran endeavours to imbue their historically flawed 
arguments with a ‘pseudo-scientific basis’ in order to position themselves within discourses of 
rationality and reason. This may constitute a strategy for minimising those threats to belonging 
which are associated with voicing denial of the extent and depth of Nazi brutality.  
By emphasising the collective opposition of the Western institutions to Iranian attempts 
to ‘forward the field of social science’ through their ‘critical evaluation’ of the Holocaust, the 
Islamic regime is able to encourage feelings of solidarity and mutual acceptance between 
Western and Iranian ‘researchers’ of the Holocaust. The crucial point is that they, an ‘oppressed’ 
minority, are allegedly silenced by a much more powerful outgroup committed to the ‘Jewish 
conspiracy’. Even large-scale social groups such as ethnic and national groups need to belong 
within a social matrix. Strategic self-positioning alongside Western Holocaust deniers perhaps 
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provide these feelings of inclusion and acceptance, which counteract the threats to belonging 
entailed by ‘otherisation’ from the international community. Crucially, the fact that Western 
Holocaust deniers are largely considered to be racist, neo-Nazis with little scholarly credibility 
becomes irrelevant in the Iranian context, given their strategic rejection of ‘Western criteria’ in 
relation to this particular matter. 
Iranian Holocaust denial may plausibly be regarded as a common self-aspect which forms 
the basis for collective identification with like-minded parties, such as other anti-Semites in the 
Middle East as well as Western Holocaust deniers. Thus, the Islamic regime is commended by 
both Hamas’ political leader who is committed to the destruction of Israel, and by Frenchman 
Robert Faurisson who infamously referred to the Holocaust as a ‘fairy tale’. The regime acquires 
acceptance and inclusion from diverse social groups. Indeed, ‘the common enmity to Jews and to 
Israel enables both groups, the Western neo-Nazis and the Iranian Islamists, to gloss over 
differences between them’.66 Crucially, this facilitates a sense of acceptance and inclusion in 
group terms, as well as the possibility of self-positioning within discourses of rationality and 
legitimacy. This safeguards the continuity of the Islamic Republic’s anti-Semitism without 
jeopardising the important sense of belonging, habitually imperilled by this very tenet of the 
regime. The strategy of the regime is to block the public’s exposure to hegemonic social 
representations of the Holocaust, arising from historically valid, rigorous academic research into 
this historical event. Conversely, it provides disproportionate media attention to social 
representations associated with a small number of racist European neo-Nazi Holocaust deniers. 
 
The inter-relations between Jewish self-efficacy and ingroup self-efficacy 
Group vitality theorists argue that in conflictual intergroup situations perceived outgroup vitality 
(the perception that the outgroup possesses: (i) high social status; (ii) high institutional support; 
and (iii) a sufficiently large population) may be negatively correlated with perceived ingroup 
vitality.67 Thus, if individuals regard a competing outgroup’s institutional support to be high, 
they may be inclined to attenuate their own group’s level of institutional support. This will likely 
apply when the psychological intergroup repertoire is negative.68 Similarly, it is possible that, in 
conflictual intergroup contexts, the perception that a competing outgroup has high self-efficacy 
(competence and control in a given social domain) will be negatively correlated with perceived 
ingroup self-efficacy. In short, believing that an ‘antagonistic’ outgroup has more competence 
and control may undermine belief in ingroup self-efficacy, possibly due to feelings of outgroup 
threat.69 The threatening outgroup may be seen as actively attempting to enhance their own self-
efficacy, while jeopardising that of the ingroup. The Islamic regime does indeed hold and 
encourage a negative psychological intergroup repertoire with Israel and Jews in general. Thus, 
Jewish self-efficacy may be regarded by the regime as undermining Muslim ingroup self-
efficacy. Crucially, the ensuing perception of weak ingroup self-efficacy places identity in a 
vulnerable position, since self-efficacy is a fundamental human motivation and a defining feature 
of identity.70 
It appears that Israel is regarded by the regime as posing threats to ingroup self-efficacy. 
Ayatollah Khomeini strategically established a link between Judaism and Zionism by anchoring 
the State of Israel to social representations of Jews’ suppression and exploitation of Muslims.71 
More specifically, he argued that Jews endeavoured to establish control of ‘Muslims lands’, best 
exemplified by the foundation of Israel, allegedly enabling them to exert religious, political and 
economic influence over Muslims. Jewish self-efficacy was largely constructed in terms of 
Jewish-Western ‘tyranny’ and ‘racism’.72 In this case, it is likely that the accentuation of 
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(Jewish) outgroup self-efficacy will have negative outcomes for (Muslim) ingroup self-efficacy, 
given that outgroup self-efficacy is perceived to limit and actively curb that of the ingroup. 
Crucially, the abstract notion of Jewish self-efficacy is transformed into a tangible social ‘reality’ 
through its objectification in terms of the Jewish nation-state, Israel. Indeed, the Islamic Republic 
regards Zionism as ‘the culmination of a Judeo-Western political and cultural onslaught in the 
Muslim world’.73  
In Iran, as in much of the Christian world, one of the primary accusations historically 
levelled against the Jews concerns their alleged desire for ‘world control’.74 In the Iranian 
context, this accusation is substantiated primarily through reference to the social representations 
that (i) Jews have been systematically transferred to Palestine in order to gain control of ‘Muslim 
land’; and (ii) that Jews have disproportionate control of the global media and are thus able to 
exert excessive influence over the world. In the 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini habitually drew 
upon European anti-Semitic social representations of ‘Jewish world domination’ in order to 
elucidate the threat allegedly posed by Israel to Muslim ingroup self-efficacy. These 
representations were employed in order to argue that, since Jews had successfully managed to 
infiltrate and dominate the Christian world (e.g. the USA and Europe), Iran would be their next 
target. Indeed, Khomeini infamously described the Jews as ‘devouring’ America and as turning 
their attention to Iran due to their allegedly insatiable appetite for control and domination. The 
threat allegedly posed by Israel and the Jews, more generally, is multifaceted; Khomeini accused 
Israel of seeking to do away with the Koran in Iran, to ‘destroy’ the religious ingroup and to 
usurp national ingroup resources.75 These accusations collectively point to ‘excessive’ Jewish 
control and competence aimed at dismantling the control, competence and autonomy of the 
Shiite Muslim Iranian ingroup. Crucially, the self-efficacy of the Jewish outgroup was 
deliberately accentuated in political discourse in order to construct it as a ‘hyper-threat’ to the 
ingroup. This was manifested in Khomeini’s declaration that the Jews were a ‘resourceful’ 
group, capable of achieving their alleged goal of world domination. 
The Iranian regime’s accusations against the Jews share a common concern with Jewish 
control of Muslim lands and Muslim people. They are likely to have considerable clout in 
inducing stigmatising social representations of Jews and Zionists, since they threaten ingroup 
self-efficacy. The Islamic Republic’s emphasis of Jewish world domination accentuates the 
perceived threat of Israel. When the Iranian government, media and public commentators anchor 
Israel to social representations of weak ingroup self-efficacy, they implicitly suggest a strategy 
for ameliorating ingroup self-efficacy, namely the destruction of the State of Israel. Khomeini 
infamously declared that ‘a handful of wretched Jews would never have been able to accomplish 
what they have [the establishment of Israel]’ if Muslims had exerted the control and competence 
allegedly conferred upon them by God.76 Thus, it is implied that the attenuation of ingroup self-
efficacy was conducive to the accentuation of Jewish outgroup self-efficacy, culminating in the 
establishment of the Jewish State. The construal of Muslim self-efficacy as weak perhaps 
constitutes an example of ‘social complaint’ in order to mobilise the Muslim ingroup to salvage 
self-efficacy.77 
 This ‘social complaint’ is frequently articulated in Iranian political discourse. This is 
exemplified in a (religious) Friday sermon of former President of Iran Rafsanjani, who 
incidentally remains one of the most influential politicians in the Islamic Republic: 
 
The Jews should in truth be expecting the day on which this superfluous limb [Israel] 
will be torn away from the body of the Muslim region and Muslim world, and all the 
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people assembled in Israel will once again be scattered all over the world and become 
refugees78 
 
The former president clearly encourages the destruction of Israel and the enforced displacement 
of its Jewish inhabitants. However, it is implied that Muslims will ‘tear away’ the ‘superfluous 
[Jewish] limb from the body of the Muslim region’, which highlights the much anticipated 
control and competence of the Muslim ingroup. Furthermore, this re-establishment of ingroup 
self-efficacy through the destruction of a national outgroup is constructed in terms of an 
inevitable reality. Crucially, while past and present self-efficacy are threatened by the very 
existence of the State of Israel, which constitutes the objectification of Jewish self-efficacy and 
the ingroup’s lack thereof, future self-efficacy remains safe.79 Future self-efficacy is safeguarded 
through the social representation that the re-establishment of ingroup self-efficacy, through the 
imminent destruction of Israel, constitutes an inevitable reality, which ‘the Jews should in truth 
be expecting’. This is coterminous with Khomeini’s aforementioned ‘social complaint’ regarding 
the attenuation of ingroup self-efficacy. Indeed, Rafsanjani’s utterance is intended to motivate 
Muslims to take active measures to ameliorate ingroup self-efficacy through the destruction of 
Israel. The point is that Israel may threaten self-efficacy but, psychologically, it exists so that it 
can eventually be ‘removed’ by the Muslim ingroup. 
 The need to protect future self-efficacy from existing threats to past and present self-
efficacy may provide further explanation for the Islamic Republic’s extreme and perplexing 
insensitivity regarding the Holocaust. The President of Iran highlighted at the end of his 
Holocaust denial conference that ‘the life-curve of the Zionist regime has begun its descent, and 
it is now on a downward slope towards its fall [...] The Zionist regime will be wiped out, and 
humanity will be liberated.’80 This implicitly suggests that continued Holocaust denial could lead 
to the destruction of Israel. The organisation of conferences and events, which are in fact thinly 
veiled attempts to deny the reality of the Holocaust, are constructed by the Islamic regime as 
exemplifying the regime’s ‘progressiveness’ and as ‘freedom of thought’. Incidentally, the 
Islamic regime argues that these crucial values are denied to European scholars. This will likely 
enhance self-efficacy on two levels. Firstly, the Islamic Republic is able to demonstrate its 
competence and autonomy from the Western world by defiantly denying a well-documented 
historical act of genocide against the Jews. Moreover, the regime asserts its self-efficacy by 
questioning the validity of Western knowledge regarding the Holocaust, by inventing its own 
criteria for considering the history of the Holocaust. Crucially, these criteria are deliberately 
naive and open-ended so as to accommodate Holocaust denial, which, as outlined earlier, can 
enhance the belonging principle. Secondly, the regime denies the Holocaust because it regards it 
as the raison d’être of the State of Israel. This is intended to problematise the existence of the 
politico-national ‘Zionist entity’, which threatens Shiite Iranian ingroup self-efficacy. The 
Islamic Republic endeavours to demonstrate the ‘illegitimacy’ of the State of Israel through 
Holocaust denial. According to the regime, if this event never occurred, then the State of Israel, 
which threatens Muslim self-efficacy, should surely be dismantled. Incidentally, President 
Ahmadinejad has argued that ‘even if’ the Holocaust did take place, a Jewish State should be 
established on European soil rather than on ‘Muslim land’.81 In short, the regime’s denial of the 
fact that six million Jews were murdered by the Nazis may be regarded as a strategy for 
indirectly enhancing the ingroup’s self-efficacy. 
 It is likely that the Islamic regime’s future self-efficacy depends upon its perpetual 
commitment to the destruction of the State of Israel. In comparing the general Arab and Iranian 
positions regarding Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, it can be said that while ‘the Arab 
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struggle has implicitly acknowledged the reality of Israel and has sought territorial concessions 
to establish a Palestinian homeland’, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s stance has been ‘to evict the 
Jewish populace from the Middle East’.82 This seems a puzzling ideological position for a state 
that has never been involved in military, territorial or economic conflict with Israel. However, 
the answer may partly lie in the threat to Muslim ingroup self-efficacy posed by ‘Zionist 
aspirations’. The partition of Palestine to accommodate a Jewish state symbolises for the regime 
a lack of ingroup competence and control in retaining sovereignty of ‘Muslim land’.83 Moreover, 
although self-efficacy is habitually conceptualised in terms of competence and control, it is 
possible that the principle may also encompass a sense of ownership and possession, since 
psychologically this may reflect self-efficacy. Accordingly, the regime’s superordinate self-
categorisation in terms of Muslim identity means that Israel is regarded not necessarily as a 
threat to Iran per se, but rather as an overt violator of the Muslim ingroup’s self-efficacy. 
 Many political commentators have observed Iran’s attempts to establish political and 
economic hegemony in the Middle East.84 This hypothesis is most convincingly supported by 
Iran’s hard-line position regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. As argued above, the Islamic 
Republic persistently constructs itself as intolerant of the ‘Zionist regime’ whose very presence 
in Israel is considered an ‘occupation of Palestine’. The Islamic Republic’s consistent opposition 
to any peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians may be attributed to the regime’s 
desire to retain this important means of exerting power and influence over the Middle East. The 
Islamic theocracy in Iran has ‘exploited the Palestinian struggle to assert its influence, garner 
popular approbation and affirm its claim as a regional power’.85 This aggressive position 
regarding Israel can be pursued at no material cost to the ingroup. Iran’s participation in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is indirect; there is evidence that Iran provides terrorist organisations such 
as Hezbollah and Hamas with both ideological and financial support for its anti-Zionist terrorist 
activity.86 Closure to the Israeli-Arab conflict could be conducive to the cessation of Iranian 
influence in the Middle East, threatening the regime’s future aspirations for self-efficacy. 
The regime’s encouragement and dissemination of the nexus that it constitutes the 
ideological backbone of Hezbollah performs positive functions for Iran’s self-efficacy. 
Hezbollah itself constitutes a tangible objectification of Iran’s attempt to refashion regional 
norms and values. Iran is thereby constructed as empowering Muslims to resist the ‘Zionist 
regime’ and to establish control and competence of ‘Muslim lands’. For the regime, the (Shiite) 
Muslim ingroup’s ‘triumph’ over the Jewish Israeli outgroup is symbolised by Israel’s unilateral 
withdrawal from the South of Lebanon in 2000.87 Thus, Iran’s overt and outspoken demonisation 
of the State of Israel, which has included calling for it to be ‘wiped off the map’, constitutes a 
means of asserting its political influence in the Middle East. In short, anti-Zionism becomes a 
means of establishing feelings of self-efficacy. 
In its quest for enhancing ingroup self-efficacy, the Iranian regime may strategically curb 
the efficacy of the Iranian Jewish community. There is considerable historical evidence that the 
Jews of Iran were constructed by the Islamic revolutionaries in terms of a hybridised threat to the 
Muslim ingroup. Notable examples of this demonisation of Iranian Jews include Khomeini’s 
accusation that Iranian Jews conspired with Israel to defeat Islam in Iran; the threat to annihilate 
Iranian Jews circulated by the National Front of Young Iranian Muslims in 1978; and the 
conviction and execution of Iranian Jews for ‘spying’.88 Possibly as a result of this overt anti-
Semitic discrimination, ‘the leaders of the Iranian Jewish community outdo themselves in 
offering gestures of subservience toward the regime’.89 This includes the Iranian Jewish 
community’s passive ‘endorsement’ of the anti-Zionist policies of the Islamic Republic, such as 
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the condemnation of Israel’s defence strategy and foreign policy. Iranian Jews are acutely aware 
of the fact that any real or suspected allegiance to the ‘Zionist entity’ is punishable by death. In 
short, the Jewish minority has largely lost its control, competence and autonomy vis-à-vis the 
Muslim majority. There is little doubt that the Islamic Republic exerts its control over the Iranian 
Jewish minority, which could eventually ‘find itself held hostage and vulnerable to acts of 
reprisal’.90 The exertion of control over an outgroup is likely to have positive outcomes for 
ingroup self-efficacy, since this creates a power imbalance, which favours the ingroup. The 
threat to self-efficacy (induced by the perception of Jewish ‘world domination’) may be 
alleviated by the regime’s control of the Jewish community in Iran. Thus, the external Zionist 
‘threat’ is counteracted by discrimination against internal Jews. This is analogous to the process 
of downward comparison, whereby the derogation of an outgroup on one particular dimension 
may perform positive functions for ingroup self-esteem.91 Here the Shiite Iranian ingroup may 
derive feelings of self-efficacy by undermining the self-efficacy of the Iranian Jewish minority 
outgroup. The next section discusses anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in relation the continuity 
principle of identity. 
 
Continuity of Shiite ideology and the legacy of Khomeini 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist ideology underlying the Islamic Republic reflected centuries of 
Shiite anti-Semitism. It has been convincingly argued that ‘anti-Semitism is deeply ingrained in 
Shi’i Iran, both religiously and historically’.92 In many of Khomeini’s earlier writings, the Jews 
were frequently referred to as ‘infidels’ and ‘impure creatures’. Moreover, it was overtly 
recommended that Muslims refrain from physical contact and business dealings with Jews. 
Furthermore, ‘Khomeini often talked of Jews in the same breath as Israel and Zionism’, which 
resulted in the social representational conflation of both constructs. Khomeini contended that 
Iran was being ‘trampled upon under Jewish boots’ and that the Jews intended to seize control of 
Islamic countries, which was best exemplified by the ‘Zionist regime’.93 Clearly, the Islamic 
Revolution was intended to re-establish a connection between the Shiite Islam and contemporary 
Iranian culture and to ‘undo’ the perceived western influence and modernity seen as having 
infiltrated Iranian society and the Muslim world more generally.94 Israel was regarded as being 
one such Western infiltration in the Muslim world. It is noteworthy that many of the anti-Semitic 
diatribes are firmly grounded within historical religious social representations originating from 
the Koran. Thus, it is possible that the continuity principle induces anti-Semitism and that any 
revision of this stance may represent a rupture in continuity between past, present and future.  
The prominence of anti-Zionism in Khomeini’s domestic and foreign policies in the years 
preceding the Islamic Revolution resulted in this position becoming a central tenet of the version 
of ‘Iranian-ness’ promoted by the Islamic regime. Thus, it is reasonable to regard the 
maintenance of this central component of Iran’s Islamic ideology in terms of an attempt to 
safeguard continuity. Indeed, the distinctive agenda of Khomeini and his collaborators in the 
Islamic Revolution depended partly upon the collective rejection of Zionism and of the Jews 
more generally, partly because this itself was seen as symbolising ‘Western imperialism’. 
Despite the challenges to the ingroup’s social, economic and political infrastructure resulting 
partly from the rejection of and fierce opposition to the state of Israel (e.g. US sanctions and 
international censure), the Islamic Republic has maintained its anti-Zionist position. This may be 
attributed partly to the potential benefits of continued anti-Zionism for the continuity principle. 
 Similarly, the regime is motivated to preserve the perceived central tenets of Shiite Islam. 
A close consideration of the history of intergroup relations between Shiite Muslims and Jews in 
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Iran reveals the socially inferior position of the latter, evidenced primarily by the ‘Dhimmi’ 
status of non-Muslims living in Muslim countries.95 Zionism was regarded by the Iranian 
revolutionaries as a ‘challenge to the ‘correct’ historical order’ which traditionally positioned 
Jews as an inferior religious group. Moreover, the establishment of Israel ‘in the very heart of the 
lands of Islam’, which ‘deprives the Muslim people of Palestine’ is likely construed in terms of a 
threat to the continuity principle.96 More specifically, this constitutes an example of undesirable 
social change, which essentially introduces a rupture in the psychological thread connecting the 
religious ingroup’s past, present and future. The ascension of a social outgroup, which has 
traditionally occupied an inferior social position, deprives the ingroup of a suitable ‘Other’ for 
downward comparison. This produces an undesirable social reality for the historically privileged 
social group, namely Shiite Muslim Iranians. The continuity principle may well require the 
maintenance of Khomeini’s anti-Zionist position, consisting of anti-Semitic elements, in 
contemporary Iranian politics.  
 Despite the importance of continuity, the most salient challenge to Khomeini’s 
unambiguous opposition to Israel was manifested in the policy-making of the former reformist 
president of the Islamic Republic, Mohammad Khatami. In his important CNN interview in 
January 1998, he denounced the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as ‘flawed and unjust’, 
although he also stated that the regime in Iran did not ‘intend to impose our views on others or 
stand in their way [of the Palestinians]’. Moreover, foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Asefi 
stated that ‘we respect all decisions taken by the majority of the Palestinians’. These official 
assertions implied that the Iranian government would be willing to accept a two-state solution 
provided that the Palestinians reached a settlement with Israel. This, in essence, represented a 
significant shift in foreign policy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. 
Indeed, massive social change, particularly that which is perceived as entailing less favourable 
consequences for the ingroup, will likely result in threats to the continuity principle.97 
Nonetheless, it seems that Khatami’s subtle, elusive position vis-à-vis the State of Israel impeded 
such threats, particularly as Iran’s position was constructed as being consistently supportive of 
the Palestinians. In short, Khomeini’s ideological support and defence of the Palestinians 
continued, although his position on Israel did not. This ‘perceptible change from Khomeini’s 
unrelenting hostility to Israel’ was constructed within the context of a coherent and consistent 
narrative. Indeed, this is essential for the maintenance of temporal continuity in face of sudden or 
undesirable change if threat is to be evaded. 
Nonetheless, massive social change such as the implied gradual recognition of the State 
of Israel may be represented in terms of a rupture between past and present. It is noteworthy that 
post-revolution Iranian politics have been dominated by anti-Zionist social representations and 
nexuses. Current Iranian leader Ahmadinejad’s presidency has been firmly committed to 
‘rekindling the revolutionary fires that seemed long extinguished’. More specifically, the 
president’s reiteration of Khomeini’s ideals in relation to the State of Israel essentially serves to 
render salient the hitherto dormant social representations of Israel as an illegitimate ‘evil’ 
presence in the Middle East and ‘an imperial infringement on the Islamic realm’.98 Furthermore, 
this highlights the incoherence and incompatibility of the implicitly reconciliatory position 
adopted by Khatami, thereby constructing this as an illegitimate deviation from Khomeini’s 
ideology and, thus, as a threat to continuity. This line of argument is further supported by Iran’s 
swift and fervent denial that the Iranian tourism minister shook hands with his Israeli counterpart 
at a tourism fair in Madrid in 2010.99 In short, any eventual recognition of the State of Israel is 
implicitly construed as rupturing the psychological thread between past, present and future. 
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Conversely, Ahmadinejad’s renewed policy of extreme anti-Zionism, whose central tenet is the 
unconditional opposition and rejection of any planned or actual peace settlement, reflects an 
overt revitalisation of Khomeini’s legacy. This re-establishes unity between past, present and 
future. While anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist social representations can be employed in order to 
safeguard intrapsychic continuity, they can conversely be employed to strategically induce 
threats to group continuity. 
 
Constructing threats to ingroup continuity and Holocaust denial 
There are obvious ideological and strategic benefits of manifesting anti-Semitism and anti-
Zionism for the Islamic Republic. This may motivate the regime to construct threats to ingroup 
identity by accentuating the realistic and symbolic threats allegedly posed by Jews and Zionists, 
collectively. The regime regards Israel in terms of a hybridised threat to the Shiite Muslim 
Iranian ingroup, and this threat can be strategically accentuated in political rhetoric. The 
threatening aspects of Jews and Israel are construed by the Islamic regime as being inherent and 
primordial. For instance, Khomeini’s ideology held that physical contact and business dealings 
with the Jews jeopardised the ‘purity’ of Shiite Muslims, rendering them ‘najes’ (impure). This 
suggests that even passive contact with Jews is sufficient to threaten the very ‘essence’ of 
Muslims, namely their purity, and that Jews even inadvertently pose a realistic threat to 
Muslims. The social representation that intergroup contact between ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ 
groups threatens the purity of the ‘superior’ group has also been observed in work on caste 
identity in India.100 The representation that an outgroup somehow damages the ‘essence’ of the 
ingroup constructs it in terms of a realistic threat to the ingroup. A realistic threat will likely 
jeopardise the group continuity principle of identity.  
Jews have consistently been constructed in terms of a realistic threat. Khomeini 
disseminated the social representation that the Jews had historically attempted to disrupt and 
misrepresent the contents of the Koran in order to serve their own needs. This constructed 
‘Jewish threat’ to ingroup continuity is rendered salient by the existence of the State of Israel. 
Indeed, Khomeini established a rhetorical link between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism ‘by 
stating that the most visible expression of the Jewish-Christian conspiracy against Islam is the 
establishment of the State of Israel, aimed at suppressing and exploiting the Muslims’.101 Thus, 
the realistic threat allegedly posed by Jews is objectified in terms of the State of Israel, that is, the 
state constitutes a tangible expression of the abstract phenomenon of the realistic ‘Jewish threat’. 
This essentially serves to accentuate the realistic threat to Muslim group continuity by rendering 
it psychologically accessible to the ingroup. Since Khomeini’s death, Iran’s institutions have 
followed suit. Iranian newspapers such as the Tehran Times and Kayhan continue to reproduce 
demonising social representations of Jews, which depict them as falsifying and distorting the 
message of Islam.102 The constant reproduction and institutionalisation of these social 
representations and nexuses, which are anchored to historical representations and attributed to 
powerful influential figures such as Khomeini, will have considerable clout in encouraging the 
notion that Jews pose a realistic threat. 
Social representations of Jewish barbarity, many of which have been imported into Iran 
from European anti-Semitism, serve the psychosocial function of constructing Jews as evil, 
barbaric and threatening for the existence of all other religious groups. For instance, Iranian anti-
Semitic propaganda has reproduced the Medieval European representation that Jews utilise the 
blood of non-Jewish children in the preparation of mazzah – unleavened bread eaten over the 
Jewish Passover festival. There is perhaps no greater realistic threat to group continuity. Here it 
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is argued that the constructed threat to group continuity indirectly serves the agenda of the 
Islamic regime. The Shiite messiah (Mahdi), the Shiites and, most importantly, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran can thereby be represented as impeding ‘Jewish world domination’.103 This 
bolsters ingroup self-efficacy and endows the ingroup with a sense of positive distinctiveness, 
since the ingroup is represented as actively challenging the (constructed) ‘Jewish threat’ to 
ingroup continuity.  
Elsewhere, it has been argued that institutions (e.g. government, the Press) may actively 
construct realistic and symbolic threats to the ingroup for ideological purposes.104 Nonetheless, 
this is likely to result in actual identity threat. Thus, it is common for these institutions to 
propose, implicitly at least, ways of dealing with these threats to group continuity, which IPT 
would conceptualise as coping strategies. In order to ‘cope’ with this threat to group continuity, 
the regime engages in the intergroup process of delegitimisation against the State of Israel. This 
essentially entails the problematisation of Israel’s right to exist as a legitimate independent 
Jewish state. Moreover, it serves the purpose of excluding Israel from ‘acceptable’ nations.105  
One common means of delegitimising the State of Israel is Holocaust denial, as alluded 
to earlier. In addition to exemplifying the merging of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, this serves 
to downgrade ‘the legitimacy of the Jewish State, which they [Holocaust deniers] claim is based 
on the Holocaust myth’.106 Indeed, it has been observed that social representations of the 
Holocaust feature prominently in Jewish history and that they may be invoked when thinking 
about Israel’s raison d’être.107 This in fact results from the perception of perpetual threats to 
group continuity among many Israeli Jews. The general prominence of Holocaust representations 
in thinking about the existence of Israel has indirectly contributed to Holocaust denial in the 
Middle East, since it comes to be regarded by anti-Zionists as a means of delegitimising Israel.108  
For many years, the Islamic regime in Iran has ‘problematised’ the Holocaust by 
attenuating the number of victims, by rendering salient the social representation of a Nazi-Zionist 
collaborative conspiracy, and by granting extensive coverage to European Holocaust deniers. 
However, Ahmadinejad was the first Iranian leader to deny overtly that the Holocaust ever 
happened. The Islamic Republic’s problematisation of the Holocaust was vociferously 
manifested by the state-sponsored organisation of the conference entitled ‘Review of the 
Holocaust: Global Vision’ on 11th-12th December 2006 in Tehran. The perception within the 
Islamic regime that the Holocaust constitutes the primary raison d’être for the State of Israel is 
reflected in Ahmadinejad’s demand that ‘if’ the Holocaust did take place, the Jewish state should 
be located on the territory of those who perpetrated it, not on ‘Muslim lands’.  
It is noteworthy that not only official government institutions problematise social 
representations of the Holocaust, but also other Iranian social institutions such as the Iranian 
Students’ News Agency. The self-proclaimed ‘reformist’ organisation entitled a ‘research 
project’ exploring the reality of the Holocaust ‘One of History’s Biggest Lies: True Facts Casting 
Doubt on the Murder of 6 Million Jews by Hitler’. The results of the ‘research’ encouraged and 
disseminated the following social representations: (i) since the Jews had declared war on 
Germany, Nazi retaliation was justified; (ii) that gas chambers never existed in the Auschwitz 
concentration camp; (iii) Anne Frank’s personal account of the horrors of the Holocaust were ‘a 
literary forgery’.109 Crucially, the findings of this ‘research’ anchor social representations of the 
alleged Jewish conspiracy to those of Jewish support for the State of Israel, creating an 
inextricable, yet distorted link between Zionism and Judaism. The overarching conclusion was 
that the Holocaust was created by Jews in order to justify the creation of Israel. Holocaust denial 
constitutes a form of ‘social complaint’ in that it seeks to sensitise citizens to the perceived 
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‘injustice’ and ‘illegitimacy’ of Israel. By questioning the reality of the perceived raison d’être 
of Israel, the Islamic regime seeks to delegitimise the state. This is essentially an attempt to 
deprecate the social stimulus (the Holocaust), which is seen as enabling the Jewish outgroup to 
threaten Muslim ingroup continuity. The implicit intention is to motivate Iranian citizens to 
support and join the anti-Zionist cause with the aim of collectively bringing about the destruction 
of Isreal. While anti-Zionism (the rejection of Israel) may be the goal, anti-Semitism (the 
demonisation of Jews) seems to be the route to this goal. The regime views the Holocaust as a 
potential obstacle to eradicating the threat to group continuity. Conversely, it regards the 
destruction of Israel as a strategy for coping with identity threat. 
 
Conclusions 
The present article set out to explore the potential role of identity motives in the manifestation of 
anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism at the institutional level in Iran. A close consideration of key 
observations made by historians and political scientists, in particular, through the interpretive 
lens of IPT reveals the particular prominence of the belonging, self-efficacy and continuity 
principles of identity. It is suggested that these principles may underlie and motivate anti-
Semitism and anti-Zionism. Accordingly, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionist may be regarded in 
terms of strategies for actively enhancing, or for coping with threats to, these principles.110 
It has been argued that the manifestation of anti-Zionism may constitute a means of 
enhancing the vulnerable belonging principle of identity. The principle is chronically threatened 
due to ‘otherisation’ on various levels: (i) Iran is one of two non-Arab countries in the Middle 
East; (ii) it is predominantly Shiite Muslim; and (iii) Iran faces international censure. While the 
manifestation of anti-Semitism is said to have significant ‘mobilising power’ among Shiite 
Muslim Iranians, both anti-Semitism (e.g. Holocaust denial) and anti-Zionism (e.g. calling for 
the destruction of Israel) may provide self-aspects for collective identification and solidarity with 
the rest of the Muslim world. More specifically, this polemical stance provides feelings of 
acceptance and inclusion of a regime, which is otherwise ostracised in the Middle East. The 
psychosocial mechanisms essentially include the accentuation of Muslim-Jewish distinctiveness 
and the attenuation of Shiite-Sunni distinctiveness, resulting in enhanced belonging within the 
superordinate religious category Muslim. However, while overt anti-Semitism (e.g. Holocaust 
denial) and irrational anti-Zionism (e.g. calling for Israel to be wiped off the map) may enhance 
belonging in the Middle East, they frequently induce condemnation from the Western World. 
This impediment to belonging within the international community may be counteracted by re-
construing Holocaust denial as ‘legitimate’ scientific research. Moreover, the regime may 
position itself ideologically alongside Western Holocaust deniers and provide them with a 
platform to voice their conspiracy theories regarding the ‘true reality’ of the Holocaust. Strategic 
self-positioning alongside other social groups enables the regime to safeguard feelings of 
acceptance and inclusion, resulting in enhanced belonging. Crucially, the regime employs anti-
Semitic and anti-Zionist nexuses, in order to obscure intergroup differences and to mobilise the 
ingroup against a ‘common enemy’.  
Anti-Zionism is likely associated with the maintenance of ingroup self-efficacy. The 
establishment of the Jewish State on ‘Muslim lands’ is construed as a chronic threat to ingroup 
Muslim self-efficacy. Moreover, the perceived moral transgressions of Israel against the 
Palestinian people constitute a threat to ingroup self-efficacy, impeding feelings of control and 
competence. This is accentuated by the reality of Israel’s consistent victories in military conflicts 
with neighbouring Arab states since 1948. Consequently, the self-efficacy principle remains 
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vulnerable to threat, and anti-Zionism constitutes a strategy for coping with it. Crucially, the self-
efficacy principle may be delineated temporally, providing a distinction between past/ present 
and future self-efficacy. While the reality of the Jewish State threatens past/ present self-efficacy, 
future self-efficacy remains exempt from threat, since anti-Zionism is regarded as a means of 
bringing about the ‘imminent’ downfall of the ‘Zionist regime’. In short, the Iranian regime 
habitually reproduces the social representation that the Jewish State will be destroyed and that 
Muslims will eventually regain control of Palestine. In the Iranian psyche, Israel exists in the 
present so that the Muslim ingroup can eventually recapture ‘Muslim land’, in the future, in a 
dramatic display of ingroup control and competence.  
The Iranian regime derives self-efficacy from its political influence in the Middle East, 
primarily through its ideological and financial support of Hezbollah and Hamas. Indeed, the 
ability to exert influence constitutes an important source of the regime’s self-efficacy. Similarly, 
anti-Semitism plays an important role in the regime’s quest for self-efficacy. By denying the 
reality of the Holocaust (an anti-Semitic act in itself), the regime is able to question the validity 
and legitimacy of the ‘Zionist regime’, which threatens Muslim self-efficacy. In short, anti-
Semitism is regarded as a means of delegitimising and eventually destroying the State of Israel. 
At a more localised level, the regime’s ability to influence and control Jews in Iran enhances 
their own self-efficacy. This is consistent with the argument that perceptions of ingroup self-
efficacy and outgroup self-efficacy will likely be negatively correlated. 
Important historical accounts demonstrate that Iranian anti-Semitism is historically 
associated with Shiite Muslim ideology. Thus, it is suggested that the maintenance of 
Khomeini’s overt anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist ideology may constitute a means of safeguarding 
the continuity principle amid important social and political change in Iran. It is noteworthy that 
concessions have needed to be made in the regime’s policy and ideology, highlighting the 
potential for threats to continuity. Khatami’s presidency demonstrated that a gradual acceptance 
and accommodation of Israel within the Iranian identity structure may be possible, without 
necessarily threatening continuity. This may be facilitated by decreasing the salience of historical 
representations of Khomeini’s anti-Semitism and by reiterating the continued support of the 
Palestinians. However, the current Iranian president’s adamant resurrection of dormant historical 
representations condemning Jews and Israel has meant that any change in ideological position 
may be construed in terms of a threat to continuity. Indeed, the ‘Jewish threat’ to continuity is 
actively accentuated by the regime. The regime attempts to motivate Iranians to oppose the 
‘Zionist regime’ in order to cope with the realistic threat to group continuity. 
In short, both anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are pertinent to the regime’s quest to 
enhance identity. However, this is not to suggest that the two forms of prejudice are conceptually 
indistinguishable. It is acknowledged that legitimate, balanced criticism of aspects of Israeli 
political policy does not necessarily reflect anti-Semitism.111 The present paper supports the 
assertion that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are inextricably related in the political rhetoric of 
the Iranian regime, in particular.112 This is suggested by the interchangeability of the categories 
‘Jew’ and ‘Zionist’ in the regime’s political discourse, as well as the strategic demonisation of 
Jews and Zionists in order to enhance the principled operation of identity processes. For instance, 
both anti-Semitism (e.g. the persecution of Iranian Jews) and anti-Zionism (e.g. calling for the 
destruction of Israel) are seen as enhancing Muslim self-efficacy. Moreover, Holocaust denial 
(anti-Semitism) and unconditional opposition to Israel (anti-Zionism) are employed in order to 
enhance belonging within the Middle East. 
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It must be stressed that this paper focuses specifically upon the institutional level, that is, 
the manifestation of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism by the Islamic regime in Iran. The anti-
Semitic and anti-Zionist slurs in the political rhetoric of key figures in the Iranian regime cannot 
naively be generalised to the Iranian public, since little is known regarding their endorsement or 
‘personalisation’ of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist social representations. Moreover, given that the 
Iranian media follow an authoritarian press system and therefore represent the government 
position, it is difficult to make any definitive statements regarding social attitudes towards Jews 
and Israel among Iranian citizens on the basis of media research.113 However, government media 
do constitute a major source of societal information and social representations. This has led some 
to argue that ‘it is likely that ordinary Iranians, who are not exposed to the Western academic 
literature on the Holocaust, do believe the propaganda that they are served’ by the Iranian 
regime.114 This constitutes a worrying reality, in a country with some 25,000 remaining Jews and 
amid the ‘war of words’ characterising Iranian-Israeli relations. The next step is to explore some 
of the hypotheses developed in the present paper in the Iranian general population in order to 
identify possible relationships between anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and the motivational 
principles of identity. This would enhance our understanding of the psychosocial motives 
underlying anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the general population, allowing researchers to 
ascertain the level of social influence of the Iranian regime.115  
The present paper’s focus on the institutional level provides some preliminary insight into 
the socio-psychological antecedents of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the Iranian regime. 
This complements the existing socio-historical and political research, providing a more detailed, 
multi-faceted explanation for this complex socio-psychological problem. It is hoped that this 
paper will stimulate further research into this area. While anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism may 
have positive outcomes for ingroup Shiite Muslim identity, it is likely to lead to negative 
intergroup relations between Muslims and Jews in Iran, further ostracisation of the Iranian 
regime from the international community, as well as greater tensions in the Middle East region. 
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